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ABSTRACT
The exchange of data between mobile devices in the near-ultrasonic
frequency band is a new promising technology for near field com-
munication (NFC) but also raises a number of privacy concerns.
We present the first ultrasonic firewall that reliably detects ultra-
sonic communication and provides the user with effective means
to prevent hidden data exchange. This demonstration showcases a
new media-based communication technology (“data over audio")
together with its related privacy concerns. It enables users to (i) in-
teractively test out and experience ultrasonic information exchange
and (ii) shows how to protect oneself against unwanted tracking.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Multimedia and multimodal re-
trieval; Speech / audio search; Multimedia information systems;
• Security and privacy → Security services; • Networks →
Mobile and wireless security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile multimedia data (especially audio) can be used aside from
entertainment purposes also for near field communication (NFC).
Several recently introduced technologies use (almost) inaudible
near-ultrasonic signals (18-22kHz) to exchange information across
the auditory channel through the loudspeakers and microphones
of mobile devices [5, 7, 9]. This technology, also called data over
audio, enables effective near field communication capabilities but
also opens up a number of security and privacy concerns. Data
over audio can be used as a side channel to track users and their
behavior across different devices without their knowledge [13]. In
2015 already, the company Silverpush claimed to be tracking 18M
devices with their ultrasonic technology [6]. A recent study has
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Figure 1: Different ultrasonic transmission technologies.
investigated the potential risk of ultrasonic side channels by system-
atically investigating more than 1.3 million mobile applications for
ultrasonic tracking capabilities [1]. The study identified 234 applica-
tions with ultrasonic tracking functionality where the most popular
had between 1 and 5 million downloads. Furthermore, research has
shown that ultrasonic data exchange can be used as covert channel
to exfiltrate and leak information from devices [2, 4, 10]. Recently,
the threat has been recognized by researchers and first ideas for
defensive mechanisms have been proposed [8].
To prevent acoustic tracking and infiltration and to raise aware-
ness to this novel technology, we have developed a mobile ultra-
sonic firewall that monitors the ultrasonic frequency band, acousti-
cally detects different types of ultrasonic activity and notifies the
user about the hidden data transfer. To effectively protect from un-
wanted ultrasonic data exchange, our firewall provides a jamming
function that prohibits further communication. The SoniControl
firewall1 presents a first means towards the effective protection
against acoustic user- and cross-device tracking. In the following,
we present the system design and a robust real-time algorithm for
the detection and prevention of ultrasonic activity.
2 SYSTEM DESIGN
Different modulation and signal processing techniques such as fre-
quency shift keying (FSK) and phase shift keying (PSK) can be
used to encode information into an audio signal, see Figure 1 for
examples. The major challenge is the development of a detector
that is technology-agnostic and still robust to noise. Noise goes be-
yond simple additive Gaussian noise, since sounds from the audible
spectrum extend into the ultrasonic band, see also Figure 2(a). This
renders pure energy-based detectors insufficient [3, 12].
We model the spectral distribution in the ultrasound band statis-
tically, build (and continuously update) a robust background model
of the local surrounding and use this model to detect ultrasonic
1project webpage: http://sonicontrol.fhstp.ac.at
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activity. In more detail, the signal detection is performed as fol-
lows. We first remove audible frequencies with a high-pass filter
and compute the short-time FFT spectrum. We normalize the spec-
trum to remove broad-band noise, which frequently occurs in the
near-ultrasound band. After normalization, most ambient noise is
removed and the transmission frequencies become more salient,
see Figure 2(b). Each input frame is stored in a cyclic buffer of a
few seconds duration (e.g. 10s). Once the buffer is full, we compute
the median of the spectral frequency distribution over time to ob-
tain a robust estimate of the ambient sound distribution. To test
for detections, we compute the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
between the background model and the spectral distribution of the
incoming signal. The KL divergence indicates if both samples stem
from the same distribution (value range 0 to 1). We apply a simple
thresholding (threshold t ) to the KL divergence to detect changes
in the ultrasonic spectrum. Additionally, we use a running median
filter to track if changes in the spectrum sustain over longer time.
This avoids false detections and makes the system more robust.
The detector has only one parameter to tune (threshold t ) which
has shown to be rather insensitive (0.5 yielded good results in all
experiments so far).
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Figure 2: Ultrasonic noise: (a) ultrasonic messages in pres-
ence of noise; (b) noise removal by spectral normalization.
When a detection is found, an alert is shown to the user. She
can decide to let the communication pass or to actively block it
to avoid further data transfer. For each detection, we store the
time and location locally on the user’s device for future reference.
Places where the user decided to block the communication can
automatically be blocked on the next visit. To block signals, we
have implemented a flexible noise generator, which produces white
noise at selected frequencies to jam different ultrasound protocols.
For broadband signals like Google Nearby (see Figure 1) a broadband
signal is generated. To avoid any type of ultrasonic communication,
the user can switch on preventive blocking, which starts jamming
immediately when a signal is detected.
To reduce the power consumption and unnecessary noise pollu-
tion, as an alternative to acoustic blocking, we first try to obtain
exclusive access to the microphone to avoid other apps listening to
ultrasound. Note that this does not affect voice telephony.
2.1 Implementation
The system has been implemented for Android 4.1 and above and
uses the Superpowered library for audio processing [11]. It requires
a minimum of permissions (microphone and optionally location)
and has been highly optimized to reduce computing power (CPU
consumption ≤ 15% on a Samsung Galaxy S5 phone. Source code is
available at: https://git.nwt.fhstp.ac.at/m.zeppelzauer/SoniControl.
2.2 Experiments
Experiments with a dataset of ultrasonic sound recordings2 have
shown that the detection algorithm is able to robustly detect differ-
ent transmission protocols, including Google Nearby, Lisnr, Silver-
push, and Sonarax. The proposed blocking strategy has shown to
be effective in most cases, except when the loudness of the sender
exceeds a certain volume and thus drowns the jamming signal.
3 DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM
Figure 3 depicts our demonstration setup, which interactively show-
cases first, how to send data via ultrasound between devices and sec-
ond, how to detect and block ultrasonic communication effectively.
Thanks to spectrogram displays, the user can see what happens
during this inaudible process. The user can also participate in the
demo herself by (i) sending and receiving ultrasonic information
as well as by (ii) trying out the SoniControl firewall on her own
device to detect and block unwanted traffic.
Figure 3: The real-time demonstration system. Users can
participate by downloading our app fromGoogle Play Store.
4 CONCLUSION
We have implemented a first ultrasonic firewall that detects differ-
ent types of ultrasonic transmission technologies in real-time and
provides an effective means to prevent unwanted data exchange.
The app “SoniControl” has been recently released in Google’s Play
Store (until now 17000 downloads) and the source code is provided
publicly to the community. As a primary goal, the app should raise
awareness to novel multimedia-based data exchange practices and
improve privacy protection.
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